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No scientiﬁc conclusion follows automatically from a statistically non-signiﬁcant result,
yet people routinely use non-signiﬁcant results to guide conclusions about the status
of theories (or the effectiveness of practices). To know whether a non-signiﬁcant result
counts against a theory, or if it just indicates data insensitivity, researchers must use one
of: power, intervals (such as conﬁdence or credibility intervals), or else an indicator of
the relative evidence for one theory over another, such as a Bayes factor. I argue Bayes
factors allow theory to be linked to data in a way that overcomes the weaknesses of the
other approaches. Speciﬁcally, Bayes factors use the data themselves to determine their
sensitivity in distinguishing theories (unlike power), and they make use of those aspects of
a theory’s predictions that are often easiest to specify (unlike power and intervals, which
require specifying the minimal interesting value in order to address theory). Bayes factors
provide a coherent approach to determining whether non-signiﬁcant results support a null
hypothesis over a theory, or whether the data are just insensitive.They allow accepting and
rejecting the null hypothesis to be put on an equal footing. Concrete examples are provided
to indicate the range of application of a simple online Bayes calculator, which reveal both
the strengths and weaknesses of Bayes factors.
Keywords: Bayes factor, confidence interval, highest density region, null hypothesis, power, statistical inference,
significance testing
INTRODUCTION
Users of statistics, in disciplines from economics to sociology to
biology to psychology, have had a problem. The problem is how
to interpret a non-signiﬁcant result. A non-signiﬁcant result can
mean one of two things: either that there is evidence for the null
hypothesis and against a theory that predicted a difference (or
relationship); or else that the data are insensitive in distinguish-
ing the theory from the null hypothesis and nothing follows from
the data at all. (Indeed, in the latter case, a non-signiﬁcant result
might even somewhat favor the theory, e.g., Dienes, 2008, p. 128,
as will be seen in some of the examples that follow.) That is, the
data might count in favor of the null and against a theory; or
they might count for nothing much. The problem is that peo-
ple have been choosing one of those two interpretations without
a coherent reason for that choice. Thus, non-signiﬁcant results
have been used to count against theories when they did not (e.g.,
Cohen, 1990; Rosenthal, 1993; Rouder et al., 2007); or else have
been ignored when they were in fact informative (e.g., believing
that an apparent failure to replicate with a non-signiﬁcant result
is more likely to indicate noise produced by sloppy experimenters
than a true null hypothesis; cf. Greenwald, 1993; Pashler and Har-
ris, 2012; Kruschke, 2013a). One can only wonder what harm has
been done to ﬁelds by not systematically determining which inter-
pretation of a non-signiﬁcant result actually holds. There are three
solutions on the table for evaluating a non-signiﬁcant result for a
single study: (1) power; (2) interval estimates; and (3)Bayes factors
(and related approaches). In this article, I will discuss the ﬁrst two
brieﬂy (because readers are likely to be most familiar with them)
indicating their uses and limitations; then describe how Bayes fac-
tors overcome those limitations (and what weaknesses they in turn
have). The bulk of the paper will then provide detailed examples of
how to interpret non-signiﬁcant results using Bayes factors, while
otherwise making minimal changes to current statistical practice.
My aim is to clarify how to interpret non-signiﬁcant results coher-
ently, using whichever method is most suitable for the situation,
in order to effectively link data to theory. I will be concentrating
on a method of using Bayes that involves minor changes in adapt-
ing current practice. The changes therefore can be understood by
reviewers and editors even as they operate under orthodox norms
(see, e.g., Allen et al., 2014) while still solving the fundamental
problem of distinguishing insensitive data from evidence for a
null hypothesis.
ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEM
Imagine that there really is an effect in the population, and the
power of an experimental procedure is 0.5 (i.e., only 50 out of 100
tests would be signiﬁcant when there is an actual, real effect; not
that in reality we know what the real effect is, nor, therefore, what
the power is for the actual population effect). The experiment
is repeated exactly many times. Cumming (2011; see associated
website) provides software for simulating such a situation; the
use of simulation of course ensures that each simulation is iden-
tical to the last bar the vagaries of random sampling. A single
run (of Cumming’s “ESCI dance p”) generated the sequence of p-
values shown in Figure 1. Cumming (2011) calls such sequences
the “dance of the p-values.” Notice how p-values can be very
high or very low. For example, one could obtain a p-value of
0.028 (experiment 20) and in the very next attempted replica-
tion get a p of 0.817, when nothing had changed in terms of the
population effect. There may be a temptation to think the p of
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FIGURE 1 | Dance of the p-values. A sequence of p-values (and conﬁdence intervals) for successive simulations of an experiment where there is an actual
effect (mean population difference = 10 units) and power is 0.5. Created from software provided by Cumming (2011; associated website).
0.817 represents very strong evidence for the null; it is “very non-
signiﬁcant.” In fact, a p-value per se does not provide evidence
for the null, no matter “how non-signiﬁcant” it is (Fisher, 1935;
Royall, 1997). A non-signiﬁcant p-value does not distinguish evi-
dence for the null from no evidence at all (as we shall see). That
is, one cannot use a high p-value in itself to count against a the-
ory that predicted a difference. A high p-value may simply reﬂect
data insensitivity, a failure to distinguish the null hypothesis from
the alternative because, for example, the standard error (SE) is
high. Given this, how can we tell the meaning of a non-signiﬁcant
result?
SOLUTIONS ON THE TABLE
POWER
A typical orthodox solution to determining whether data are sen-
sitive is power (Cohen, 1988). Power is the property of a decision
rule deﬁned by the long run proportion of times it leads to rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis given the null is actually false. That
is, by ﬁxing power one controls long run Type II error rates (the
rate at which one accepts the null given it is false, i.e., the converse
of power). Power can be easily calculated with the free software
Gpower (Faul et al., 2009): To calculate a priori power (i.e., in
advance of collecting data, which is when it should be calcu-
lated), one enters the effect size predicted in advance, a number
of participants, the signiﬁcance level to be used, and a power is
returned.
To calculate power, in entering the effect size, one needs to
know the minimal difference (relationship) below which the the-
ory would be rendered false, irrelevant or uninteresting. If one
did not use the minimal interesting value to calculate power
one would not be controlling Type II error rates. If one used
an arbitrary effect size (e.g., Cohen’s d of 0.5), one would be
controlling error rates with respect to an arbitrary theory, and
thus in no principled way controlling error rates for the theories
one was evaluating. If one used a typical effect size, but not the
minimal interesting effect size, type II error rates would not be
controlled.
Power is an extremely useful concept. For example, imagine a
review of 100 studies that looked at whether meditation improved
depression. Fifty studies found statistically signiﬁcant results in
the right direction and 50 were non-signiﬁcant. What can be
concluded about the effectiveness of meditation in treating depres-
sion? One intuition is that each statistically signiﬁcant result trades
off against each statistically non-signiﬁcant result, and nothing
much follows from these data: More research is needed. This intu-
ition is wrong because it ignores power. How many experiments
out of 100wouldbe statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level if thenull
were true? Only ﬁve – that’s the meaning of a 5% signiﬁcance level.
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(There may be a “ﬁle drawer problem” in that not all null results
get published; but if all signiﬁcant results were reported, and the
null were true, one would expect half to be statistically signiﬁcant
in one direction and half in the other.) On the other hand, if an
effect really did exist, and the power was 50%, how many would
be statistically signiﬁcant out of 100? Fifty – that’s the meaning of
a power of 50%1 In fact, the obtained pattern of results categor-
ically licenses the assertion that meditation improves depression
(for this ﬁctional data set).
Despite power being a very useful concept, there are two prob-
lems with power in practice. First, calculating power requires
specifying the minimal interesting value, or at least the mini-
mal interesting value that is plausible. This may be one of the
hardest aspects of a theory’s predictions to specify. Second, power
cannot use the data themselves in order to determine how sen-
sitively those very data distinguish the null from the alternative
hypothesis. It might seem strange that properties of the data
themselves cannot be used to indicate how sensitive those data
are. But post hoc or observed power, based on the effect size
obtained in the data, gives no information about Type II error
rate (Baguley, 2004): such observed power is determined by the
p-value and thus gives no information in addition to that pro-
vided by the p-value, and thus gives no information about Type
II error rate. (To see this, consider that a sensitive non-signiﬁcant
result would have a mean well below the minimally interesting
mean; power calculated on the observed mean, i.e., observed
power, would indicate the data insensitive, but it is the mini-
mally interesting mean that should be used to determine power.)
Intervals, such as conﬁdence intervals solve the second prob-
lem; that is, they indicate how sensitive the data are, based on
the very data themselves. But intervals do not solve the ﬁrst
problem, that of specifying minimally interesting values, as we
shall see.
INTERVAL ESTIMATES
Interval estimates include conﬁdence intervals, and their like-
lihood and Bayesian equivalents, namely, likelihood intervals
and credibility intervals (also called highest density regions; see
Dienes, 2008, for comparison). A conﬁdence interval is the set
of possible population values consistent with the data; all other
population values may be rejected (see e.g., Smithson, 2003; Cum-
ming, 2011). TheAPA recommends reporting conﬁdence intervals
whenever possible (American Psychological Association [APA],
2010). However, why should one report a conﬁdence interval,
unless it changes what conclusions might be drawn? Many statis-
tics textbooks teach how to calculate conﬁdence intervals but few
teach how to use them to draw inferences about theory (for an
exception see Lockhart, 1998). Figure 2 shows the four principles
of inference by intervals (adapted from Freedman and Spiegelhal-
ter, 1983; Serlin and Lapsley, 1985; Rogers et al., 1993; Kruschke,
2010a; Berry et al., 2011). A non-signiﬁcant result means that the
conﬁdence interval (of the difference, correlation, etc) contains
1Typical for psychology is nomore than 50%. Cohen (1962), Sedlmeier andGigeren-
zer (1989); see Button et al. (2013), for a considerably lower recent estimate in some
disciplines.
FIGURE 2 |The four principles of inference by intervals. (i) If the interval
is completely contained in the null region, decide that the population value
lies in the null region (accept the null region hypothesis); (ii) If the interval is
completely outside the null region, decide that the population value lies
outside the null region (reject the null region hypothesis); (iii) If the upper
limit of the interval is below the minimal interesting value, decide against a
theory postulating a positive difference (reject a directional theory); (iv) If
the interval includes both null region and theoretically interesting values,
the data are insensitive (suspend judgment).
the null value (here assumed to be 0). But if the conﬁdence inter-
val includes 0, it also includes some values either side of 0; so the
data are always consistent with some population effect. Thus, in
order to accept a null hypothesis, the null hypothesis must specify
a null region, not a point value. Specifying the null region means
specifying a minimally interesting value (just as for power), which
forms either limit of the region. Then if the interval is contained
within the null region, one can accept the null hypothesis: The
only allowable population values are null values (rule i; cf equiv-
alency testing, Rogers et al., 1993). If the interval does not cover
the null region at all, the null hypothesis can be rejected. The only
allowable population values are non-null (rule ii). Conversely if
the interval covers both null and non-null regions, the data are
insensitive: the data allow both null and non-null values (rule iv;
see e.g., Kiyokawa et al., 2012 for an application of this rule).
In Figure 1, 95% conﬁdence intervals are plotted. In all cases
where the outcome was non-signiﬁcant, the interval included not
just 0 but also the true population effect (10). Given that 10 is
agreed to be an interesting effect size, the conﬁdence intervals
show all the non-signiﬁcant outcomes to be insensitive. In all those
cases the data should not be used to count against the theory of a
difference (rule iv). The conclusion follows without determining a
scientiﬁcally relevantminimally interesting value. But a conﬁdence
interval can only be used to assert the null hypothesis when a null
region can be speciﬁed (rule i; cf Hodges and Lehmann, 1954;
Greenwald, 1975; Serlin and Lapsley, 1985; Cohen, 1988). For that
assertion to be relevant to a given scientiﬁc context, the minimal
value must be relevant to that scientiﬁc context (i.e., it cannot
be determined by properties of the data alone nor can it be a
generic default). For example, in clinical studies of depression it
has been conventionally decided that a change of three units on the
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Hamilton scale is the minimal meaningful amount (e.g., Kirsch,
2010)2. Rule ii follows logically from rule i. Yet rule ii is stricter
than current practice, because it requires the whole null region lie
outside the interval, not just 03.
While intervals can provide a systematic basis of inference
which would advance current typical practice, they have a major
problem in providing guidance in interpreting non-signiﬁcant
results. The problem is that asserting the null (and thus reject-
ing the null with a procedure that could have asserted it) requires
in general specifying the minimally interesting value:What facts in
the scientiﬁc domain indicate a certain value as a reasonable min-
imum? That may be the hardest part of a theory’s predictions to
specify.4 If you ﬁnd it hard to specify the minimal value, you have
just run out of options for interpreting a non-signiﬁcant result as
far as orthodoxy is concerned.
BAYES FACTORS
Bayes factors (B) indicate the relative strength of evidence for two
theories (e.g., Berger and Delampady, 1987; Kass and Wasserman,
1996; Goodman, 1999; Lee and Wagenmakers, 2005; Gallistel,
2009; Rouder et al., 2009; Dienes, 2011; Kruschke, 2011).5 The
Bayes factor B comparing an alternative hypothesis to the null
hypothesis means that the data are B times more likely under
the alternative than under the null. B varies between 0 and ∞,
where 1 indicates the data do not favor either theory more than
the other; values greater than 1 indicate increasing evidence for
one theory over the other (e.g., the alternative over a null hypoth-
esis) and values less than 1 the converse (e.g., increasing evidence
2Rule (i) is especially relevant for testing the assumptions of a statistical model.
Take the assumption of normality in statistical tests. The crucial question is not
whether the departure from normality is non-signiﬁcant; but rather, whether what-
ever departure as exists is within such bounds that it does not threaten the integrity
of the inferential test used. For example, is the skewness of the data within such
bounds such that when the actual alpha rate (signiﬁcance) is 5% the estimated rate
is between 4.5% and 5.5%? Or is the skewness of the data within such bounds such
that a Bayes factor calculated assuming normality lies between 2.9 and 3.1 if the
Bayes factor calculated on the true model is 3? See Simonsohn et al. (unpublished)
for an example of interval logic in model testing. Using intervals inferentially would
be a simple yet considerable advance on current practice in checking assumptions
and model ﬁt.
3If inferences are drawn using Bayesian intervals (e.g., Kruschke, 2010a), then it is
rules i and ii that must be followed. The rule of rejecting the null when a point null
lies outside the credibility interval has no basis in Bayesian inference (a point value
always has 0 probability on a standard credibility interval); correspondingly, such a
rule is sensitive to factors that are inferentially irrelevant such as the stopping rule
and intentions of the experimenter (Mayo, 1996; Dienes, 2008, 2011). Rules (i) and
(ii) are not sensitive to stopping rule (given interval width is not much more than
that of the null region; cf Kruschke, 2013b). Indeed, they can be used by orthodox
statisticians, who can thereby gainmany of the beneﬁts of Bayes (though see Lindley,
1972; and Kruschke, 2010b; for the advantages of going fully Bayesian when it comes
to using intervals, andDienes, 2008, for a discussion of the conceptual commitments
made by using the different sorts of intervals).
4Figure 1 represents the decisions as black and white, in order to be consistent
with orthodox statistics. For Bayesians, inferences can be graded. Kruschke (2013c)
recommends specifying the degree to which the Bayesian credibility interval is con-
tained within null regions of different widths so people with different null regions
can make their own decisions. Nonetheless, pragmatically a conclusion needs to be
reached and so a good reason still need to be speciﬁed for accepting any one of those
regions.
5Bayes factors were independently discovered at about the same time by Harold
Jeffreys et al. (1939/1961) andAlanTuring, the latter in order to help decodeGerman
messages during World War II (McGrayne, 2012).
for the null over the alternative hypothesis). Thus, Bayes factors
allow three different types of conclusions: There is strong evi-
dence for the alternative (B much greater than 1); there is strong
evidence for the null (B close to 0); and the evidence is insensi-
tive (B close to 1). This is already much more than p-values could
give us.
In order to draw these conclusions we need to know how far
from 1 counts as strong or substantial evidence and how close to
1 counts as the data being insensitive. Jeffreys et al. (1939/1961)
suggested conventional cut-offs: A Bayes factor greater than 3 or
else less than 1/3 represents substantial evidence; conversely, any-
thing between 1/3 and 3 is only weak or “anecdotal” evidence.6
Are these just numbers pulled out of the air? In the examples
considered below, when the obtained effect size is roughly that
expected, a p of 0.05 roughly corresponds to a B of 3. This is not
a necessary conclusion, nothing guarantees it; but it may be no
coincidence that Jeffreys developed his ideas in Cambridge just
as Fisher (1935) was developing his methods. That is, Jeffreys
choice of three is fortunate in that it roughly corresponds to the
standards of evidence that scientists have been used to using in
rejecting the null. By symmetry, we automatically get a standard
for assessing substantial evidence for the null: If 3 is substan-
tial evidence for the alternative, 1/3 is substantial evidence for
the null. (Bear in mind that there is no one-to-one correspon-
dence of B with p-values, it depends on both the obtained effect
size and also how precise or vague the predictions of the alter-
native are: With a sufﬁciently vague alternative a B of three may
match a p-value of, for example, 0.01, or lower; Wetzels et al.,
2011).
The Bayes factor is based on the principle that evidence sup-
ports the theory that most strongly predicted it. That is, in order
to know how much evidence supports a theory, we need to know
what the theory predicts. For the null hypothesis this is easy. Tra-
ditionally, the null hypothesis predicts that a single population
value (typically 0) is plausible and all other population values are
ruled out. But what does our theory, providing the alternative
hypothesis, predict? Specifying the predictions of the theory is the
difﬁcult part of calculating a Bayes factor. The examples below,
drawn partly from published studies, will show some straightfor-
ward methods theoretical predictions can be speciﬁed in a way
suitable for Bayes factors. The goal is to determine a plot of the
plausibility of different population values given the theory in its
scientiﬁc context. Indeed, whatever one’s views on Bayes, thinking
about justiﬁcations for minimum, typical or maximum values of
an effect size in a scientiﬁc context is a useful exercise. We have
to consider at least some aspect of such a plot to evaluate non-
signiﬁcant results; theminimumplausible value has to be speciﬁed
for using power or conﬁdence (credibility or likelihood) intervals
in order to evaluate theories. That is, we should have been speci-
fying theoretically relevant effect sizes anyway. We could get away
without doing so, because speciﬁed effect sizes are not needed for
6Jeffreys et al. (1939/1961) also recommended labeling Bayes factors greater than 10
or less than 1/10 as “strong” evidence. However, the terms“substantial” and“strong”
have little to choose between them. Thus Lee and Wagenmakers (2014) recommend
calling Bayes factors greater than 3 or less than a 1/3 as “moderate” and those greater
than 10 or less than 1/10 as “strong.”
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calculating p-values; but the price has been incoherence in inter-
preting non-signiﬁcant (as well as signiﬁcant) results. It might
be objected that having to specify the minimum was one of the
disadvantages of inference by intervals; but as we will see in con-
crete examples, Bayes is more ﬂexible about what is sufﬁcient to
be speciﬁed (e.g., rough expected value, or maximum), and differ-
ent scientiﬁc problems end up naturally specifying predictions in
different ways.
For the free online Bayes factor calculator associated
with Dienes (2008; http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_
Dienes/inference/bayes_factor.swf), there are three distributions
that can be used to represent the predictions of the theory: Uni-
form, normal or half-normal (seeFigure 3). The properties of each
distribution will be brieﬂy described in turn, before considering
concrete examples of Bayes factors in practice in the next section.
FIGURE 3 | Representing the alternative hypothesis. (A) A uniform
distribution with all population parameter values from the lower to the
upper limit equally plausible. Here the lower limit is 0, a typical but not
required value. (B) A normal distribution, with population parameter values
close to the mean being more plausible than others. The SD also needs to
be speciﬁed; a default of mean/2 is often useful. (C) A half-normal
distribution. Values close to 0 are most plausible; a useful default for the SD
is a typical estimated effect size. Population values less than 0 are ruled out.
Note these distributions plot the plausibility of different values of
the population parameter being tested, for example the plausibility
of population means or mean differences. The distributions in
Figure 3 in no way reﬂect the distribution of individual values
in the population. The Dienes (2008) Bayes calculator assumes
that the sampling distribution of the parameter estimate is nor-
mally distributed (just as a t-test does), and this obtains when,
for example, the individual observations in the population are
normally distributed. Thus, there may be a substantial propor-
tion of people with a score below 0 in the population, and we
could correctly believe this to be true while also assigning no
plausibility to the population mean being below 0 (e.g., using a
uniform from 0 to 10 in Figure 3). That is, using a uniform or
half-normal distribution to represent the alternative hypothesis is
entirely consistent with the data themselves being normally dis-
tributed. The distributions in Figure 3 are about the plausibility
of different population parameter values (e.g., population means
of a condition or population mean differences or associations,
etc.).
First, we consider the uniform. A researcher tests whether
imagining a sporting move (e.g., a golf swing) for 15 min a
day for a week improves measured performance on the move.
She performs a t-test and obtains a non-signiﬁcant result. Does
that indicate that imagination in this context is not useful for
improving the skill? That depends on what size effect is predicted.
Just knowing that the effect is non-signiﬁcant is in itself mean-
ingless. Presumably, whatever size the population effect is, the
imagination manipulation is unlikely to produce an effect larger
than that produced by actually practicing the move for 15 min
a day for a week. If the researcher trained people with real per-
formance to estimate that effect, it could be used as the upper
limit of a uniform in predicting performance for imagination. If
a clear minimum level of performance can be speciﬁed in a way
simple to justify, that could be used as the lower limit of the uni-
form; otherwise, the lower limit can be set to 0 (in practice, the
results are often indistinguishable whether 0 or a realistic min-
imum is used, though in every particular case this needs to be
checked; cf. Shang et al., 2013). In general, when another con-
dition or constraint within the measurement itself determines
an upper limit, the uniform is useful, with a default of 0 as the
lower limit. An example of a constraint produced by the measure-
ment itself is a scale with an upper limit; for a 0–7 liking scale,
the difference between conditions cannot be more than seven.
(The latter constraint is quite vague and we can usually do better;
for example, by constraints provided by other data. See Dienes,
in press, for examples of useful constraints created by types of
scales.)
Next, we consider the normal distribution. Sometimes what
is easily available is not another condition deﬁning an upper
limit, but data indicating a roughly likely value for an effect,
should it exist. For example, it may be known for an implicit
learning paradigm that asking people to search for rules rather
than passively memorizing training material reduces classiﬁca-
tion accuracy in a later test phase by about 5%. A researcher
may wish to change the manipulation by having people search
for rules or not, not during the training phase as before, but
between training and testing (cf. Mealor and Dienes, 2012). In
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the new experiment we may think 5% a reasonable estimate of
the effect size that would be obtained (especially as we think sim-
ilar mechanisms would be involved in producing the two effects).
Further, if there is an effect in the post-training manipulation,
we may have no strong reason to think it would be more than
or less than the effect in the training manipulation. A natural
way of representing this prediction of the theory is a normal
distribution with a mean of 5%. What should the standard devi-
ation (SD) of the normal distribution be? The theory predicts
an effect in a certain direction; namely searching for rules will
be harmful for performance. Thus, we require the plausibility
of negative differences to be negligible. The height of a nor-
mal distribution comes pretty close to 0 by about two SDs out.
Thus, we could set two SDs to be equal to the mean; that is,
SD = mean/2. This representation uses another data set to pro-
vide a most likely value – but otherwise keeps predictions as
vague as possible (any larger SD would involve non-negligible
predictions in the wrong direction; any smaller SD would indi-
cate more precision in our prediction). Using SD = mean/2
is a useful default to consider in the absence of other consid-
erations; we will consider exceptions below. With this default,
the effect is predicted to lie between 0 and twice the estimated
likely effect size. Thus, we are in no way committed to the likely
effect size; it just sets a ball park estimate, with the true effect
being possibly close to the null value or indeed twice the likely
value.
When there is a likely predicted effect size, as in the pre-
ceding example, there is another way we can proceed. We
can use the half-normal distribution, with a mode at 0, and
scale the half-normal distribution’s rate of drop by setting the
SD equal to the likely predicted value. So, to continue with
the preceding example, the SD would be set to 5%. The
half-normal distribution indicates that smaller effect sizes are
more likely than larger ones, and whatever the true popula-
tion effect is, it plausibly lies somewhere between 0 and 10%.
Why should one use the half-normal rather than the normal
distribution? In fact, Bayes factors calculated either way are typ-
ically very similar; but the half-normal distribution considers
values close to the null most plausible, and this often makes
it hard to distinguish the alternative from the null. Thus, if
the Bayes factor does clearly distinguish the theories with a
half-normal distribution, we have achieved clear conclusions
despite our assumptions. The conclusion is thereby strength-
ened. For this reason, a useful default for when one has a
likely expected value is to use the half-normal distribution.
(We will consider examples below to illustrate when a normal
distribution is the most natural representation of a particular
theory.)
To summarize, to know how much evidence supports a theory
we need to know what the theory predicts. We have con-
sidered three possible ways of representing the predictions of
the alternative, namely, the uniform, normal, and half-normal
distributions. Representing the predictions of the alternative
hypothesis is the part of performing Bayes that requires most
thought. This thinking about the predictions of scientiﬁc the-
ory can apparently be avoided by conventionally deciding on
a default representation of the predictions of the alternative to
use in all or most cases (e.g., Jeffreys et al., 1939/1961; Box
and Tiao, 1973; Liang et al., 2008; Rouder et al., 2009; Rouder,
2012; Rouder and Morey, 2011; Wetzels and Wagenmakers, 2012;
Wetzels et al., 2012). But as there is no default theory in sci-
ence, a researcher still has the responsibility of determining
whether the default representation used in any Bayes factor
reasonably matches the predictions of their theory – and if
it does not, that particular Bayes factor is not relevant for
assessing the theory; one or more others will be. (See Van-
paemel and Lee, 2012, for the corresponding argument in
computational modeling, that distributions over parameters are
also best informed by scientiﬁc knowledge rather than gen-
eral defaults.) Thus, Rouder et al. (2009, p. 232) recommend
using content-speciﬁc constraints on specifying the alterna-
tive in the Bayes factor where this is possible. Vanpaemel
(2010) also urges representing the alternative in a way as sen-
sitive to theory as possible. Fortunately, more than a dozen
papers have been published over the last couple of years illus-
trating the use of simple objectively-speciﬁed content-speciﬁc
(non-default) constraints for Bayes factors in their particular
scientiﬁc domains (e.g., Gallistel, 2009; Morey and Rouder,
2011; Newell and Rakow, 2011; Buhle et al., 2012; Dienes
et al., 2012; Armstrong and Dienes, 2013; Dienes and Hut-
ton, 2013; Fu et al., 2013a; Guo et al., 2013a,b; Mealor and
Dienes, 2013a,b; Parris and Dienes, 2013; Semmens-Wheeler et al.,
2013; Shang et al., 2013; Terhune et al., 2013). Some principles
are illustrated below. The three possible ways of represent-
ing the alternative hypothesis considered here turn out to be
sufﬁcient for representing theoretical intuitions in many sci-
entiﬁc contexts. While the alternative requires some thought,
a default is used for the null in the Dienes (2008) calcula-
tor; it assumes the null hypothesis is that the true population
value is exactly 0. We will consider in Appendix 1 how to
change this according to scientiﬁc context as well (cf. Morey
and Rouder, 2011, who also allow for ﬂexible non-default
nulls).
To know how much evidence supports a theory, we need to
know what the evidence is. For a situation where a t-test or
a z-test can be performed, the relevant summary of the data
is the parameter estimate and its SE: For example, the sam-
ple mean difference and the SE of the difference. This is the
same as for a t-test (or z-test); a t value just is the param-
eter estimate divided by its SE. So if one knows the sample
mean difference, the relevant SE can be obtained by: mean dif-
ference/t, where t can be obtained through SPSS, R, etc. This
formula works for a between-participants, within-participants,
mixed or one sample t-test. Thus, any researcher reading a paper
involving a t-test (or any F with one degree of freedom; the cor-
responding t is the square root of the F), or performing their
own t-test (or F with one degree of freedom) can readily obtain
the two numbers summarizing the data needed for the Bayes
factor.
The Dienes (2008) calculator asks for the mean (i.e., param-
eter estimate in general, including mean difference) and the SE
of this estimate. It also asks if the p(population value| the-
ory; i.e., the plausibility of different population values given
the theory) is uniform: If the answer is “yes,” boxes appear
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to enter the lower and upper bounds; if the answer is “no,”
boxes appear to set the parameters of the normal distribution.
In the latter case, to answer the question “Is the distribution
one-tailed or two-tailed?” enter “1” for a half-normal and “2” for
a normal.7
We can now use the simulations in Figure 1 to illustrate
some features of Bayes factors. Table 1 shows the sequence
of p-values obtained in the successive replications of the same
experiment with a true population raw effect size of 10 units.
Let us assume, as we did for interpreting the conﬁdence inter-
vals, that a value of 10 units is regarded as the sort of
effect size that would hold if the theory were true. Thus,
we can represent the alternative as a half-normal distribu-
tion with an SD of 10. Table 1 shows both the “dance of
the p-values” and the more graceful “tai chi of the Bayes
factors.”
The Bs are sorted into three categories: The top row is for
Bs less than 1/3 (support for null), the bottom row for Bs more
than 3 (support for alternative), and the middle row is for Bs
in the middle, indicating data insensitivity (support for neither
hypothesis). Signiﬁcant p-value’s are asterisked.
In interpreting Table 1, remember that a B above 3 indicates
substantial support for the alternative and a B less than 0.33 indi-
cates substantial support for the null. In Table 1, signiﬁcant results
are associated with Bs above 3 (because, as it happens, the effect
sizes in those cases are around the values we regarded as typical,
and not close to 0; in fact for a ﬁxed p = 0.05, B will indicate
increasing support for the null as N increases, and thus the sam-
ple mean shrinks; Lindley, 1957). Note also that Bayes factors
7Note this is not the same as specifying a 1- tailed or 2-tailed test in orthodox
statistics. In orthodox statistics, conducting a 1- or 2-tailed test is a matter of
whether one would treat a result as signiﬁcant if the difference had been extreme
in just one direction (1-tailed test) or rather in either direction (2-tailed test). Such
counterfactuals do not apply to Bayes, and the criticisms of 1-tailed tests in an
orthodox sense (criticizing a researcher using a 1-tailed test because he would have
rejected the null if the results had been extreme in the other direction, even though
they were not) hence do not apply to Bayes factors (cf. Royall, 1997; Dienes, 2011).
Further, as shown in Figure 3, a two-tailed normal distribution can be used to make
a directional prediction. So 1- vs 2-tailed for the Bayes factor just refers to the shape
of the distribution used to represent the predictions of the alternative.
can be quite large (e.g., 1024); they do not scale according to our
intuitions trained on t-values8.
Crucially, in Table 1, non-signiﬁcant results correspond to
Bayes factors indicating insensitivity, that is, between 3 and 1/3.
(It is in no way guaranteed of course that Bayes factors won’t
sometimes indicate evidence for the null when the null is false.
But this example illustrates how such misleading Bayes factors
would be fewer than non-signiﬁcant p-values when the null is
false. For analytically determined general properties of error rates
with Bayes factors contrasting simple hypotheses see Royall, 1997.)
A researcher obtaining any of the non-signiﬁcant results in Table 1,
would, following a Bayesian analysis, conclude that the data were
simply insensitive and more participants should be run. The same
conclusions follow from using conﬁdence intervals, as shown in
Figure 1, using the rules of inference in Figure 2. So, if Bayes
factors often produce answers consistent with inference by inter-
vals, what does a Bayes factor buy us? It will allow us to assert the
null without knowing a minimal interesting effect size, as we now
explore. We will see that a non-signiﬁcant result sometimes just
indicates insensitivity, but it is sometimes support for the null.
EXAMPLES USING THE DIFFERENT WAYS OF REPRESENTING
THE PREDICTIONS OF THE THEORY
We will consider the uniform, normal, and half-normal in turn.
The sequence of examples serve as a tutorial in various aspects of
calculating Bayes factors and so are best read in sequence.
BAYES WITH A UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION
A manipulation is predicted to decrease an effect
Dienes et al. (2012) predicted that in a certain context a negative
mood would reduce a certain type of learning. To simplify so as
8To have them scale in a similar way as a t-value, one could take a log Bayes factor
to base 3. A log3 B above 1 indicates substantial evidence for the alternative, below
−1 substantial evidence for the null, and 0 indicates no evidence either way. The
value of 1024 in Table 1 would become 6.31, which maybe seems more“reasonable.”
Using log to base square root 3 would mean 2 and –2 are the cut offs for substantial
evidence, similar to a t-test. Compare Edwards (1992), who recommended natural
logs for Bayes factors comparing simple hypotheses. Nonetheless, I do not use log B
in this paper. Unlike t, B has an intuitive meaning: The data are B times more likely
under H1 than under H0.
Table 1 | Bayes factors corresponding to the p-values shown in Figure 1.
(A)
p 0.081 0.034* 0.74 0.034* 0.09 0.817 0.028* 0.001* 0.056 0.031* 0.279 0.024* 0.083
B, giving support for:
Null
Neither 2.96 0.52 2.70 0.46 1.73 2.96
Alternative 4.88 4.88 4.40 1024.6 3.33 4.88 4.28
(B)
p 0.002* 0.167 0.172 0.387 0.614 0.476 0.006* 0.028* 0.002* 0.024* 0.144 0.23
B, giving support for:
Null
Neither 2.16 2.12 1.01 0.65 0.75 2.36 1.73
Alternative 49.86 28.00 4.28 49.86 5.60
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to draw out certain key points, the example will depart from the
actual paradigm and results of Dienes et al. (2012). Subjects per-
form a two-alternative forced choice measure of learning, where
50% is chance. If performance in the neutral condition is 70%,
then, if the theory is correct, performance in the negative mood
condition will be somewhere between 50 and 70%. That is, the
effect of mood would be somewhere between 0% and 20%. Thus,
the predictions of a theory of a mood effect could be represented
as a uniform from 0 to 20 (in fact, there is uncertainty in this esti-
mate which could be represented, but we will discuss that issue in
the subsequent example).
Performance in the negative mood condition is (say) 65% and
non-signiﬁcantly different from that in the neutral condition,
t(50) = 0.5, p = 0.62. So the mean difference is 70% – 65% = 5%.
The SE = (mean difference)/t = 10%. Entering these values in
the calculator (mean = 5, SE= 10, uniform from 0 to 20) gives
B = 0.89. That is, the data are insensitive and do not count against
the theory that predicted negative mood would impair perfor-
mance (indeed, Dienes et al. (2012) obtained a non-signiﬁcant
result which a Bayes factor indicated was insensitive).
If the performance in the negative mood condition had been
70%, the mean difference between mood conditions would be 0.
The Bayes factor is then 0.60, still indicating data insensitivity.
That is, obtaining identical sample means in two conditions in
no way guarantees that there is compelling evidence for the null
hypothesis. If the performance in thenegativemood conditionhad
been75%, themeandifference betweenmoodconditionswouldbe
5% in the wrong direction. This is entered into the calculator as –5
(i.e., as a negative number: The calculator assumes positive means
are in the direction predicted by theory if the theory is directional).
B is then 0.43, still insensitive. That is, having the means go in the
wrong direction does not in itself indicate compelling evidence
against the theory (even coupled with a“very non-signiﬁcant”p of
0.62). If the SE were smaller, say 5 instead of 10, then a difference
of –5 gives a B of 0.16, which is strong evidence for the null and
against the theory. That is, as the SE shrinks, the data become more
sensitive, as would be expected.
The relation between SE and sensitivity allows an interesting
contrast between B and p-values. p-values do not monotonically
vary with evidence for the null: A larger p-value may correspond
to less evidence for the null. Consider a difference of 1 and a SE
of 10. This gives a t of 0.01, p = 0.99. If the difference were the
same but the SE were much smaller, e.g., 1, t would be larger, 1
and p = 0.32. The p-value is smaller because the SE is smaller.
To calculate B, assume a uniform from 0 to 20, as before. In the
ﬁrst case, where p = 0.99, B is 0.64 and in the second case, where
p= 0.32,B= 0.17. B ismore sensitive (andmore strongly supports
the null) in the second case precisely because the SE is lower in the
second case. Thus, a high p-value may just indicate the SE is large
and the data insensitive. It is a fallacy to say the data are convincing
evidence of the null just because the p-value is very high. The high
p-value may be indicating just the opposite.
Testing additivity vs interaction
Buhle et al. (2012) wished to test whether placebo pain relief works
through the samemechanism as distraction based pain relief. They
argued that if it were separate mechanisms, the effect of placebo
should be identical in a distraction vs control condition; if the
same mechanism, then placebo would have less effect in a dis-
traction condition. Estimating from their Figure 2, the effect of
placebo vs no placebo in the no distraction condition was 0.4
pain units (i.e., placebo reduced pain by 0.4 units). The effect of
placebo in the distraction condition was 0.44 units (estimated).
The placebo × distraction interaction raw effect (the difference
between the two placebo effects) is therefore 0.4 – 0.44 = –0.04
units (note that it is in the wrong direction to the theory that dis-
traction would reduce the placebo effect). The interaction was
non-signiﬁcant, F(1,31) = 0.109, p = 0.746. But in itself the
non-signiﬁcant result does not indicate evidence for additivity;
perhaps the data were just insensitive. How can a Bayes factor be
calculated?
The predicted size of the interaction needs to be speciﬁed.
Following Gallistel (2009), Buhle et al. (2012) reasoned that the
maximum size of the interaction effect would occur if distrac-
tion completely removed the placebo effect (i.e., placebo effect
with distraction = 0). Then, the interaction would be the same
size as the placebo effect in the no distraction condition (that is,
interaction = placebo effect with no distraction – placebo effect
with distraction (i.e., 0.4 – 0) = placebo effect with no distrac-
tion = 0.4). The smallest the population interaction could be (on
the theory that distraction reduces the placebo effect) is if the
placebo effect was very nearly the same in both conditions, that is
an interaction effect of as close as we like to 0. So we can represent
the plausible sizes of the interaction as a uniform from 0 to the
placebo effect in the no distraction condition, that is from 0 to 0.4.
The F of 0.109 corresponds to a t-value of
√
0.109 = 0.33. Thus
the SE of the interaction is (raw interaction effect)/t = 0.04/0.33 =
0.12. With these values (mean = 0.04, SE = 0.12, uniform from 0
to 0.4), B is 0.29, that is, substantial evidence for additivity. This
conclusion depends on assuming that the maximum the interac-
tion could be was the study’s estimate of the placebo effect with
no distraction. But this is just an estimate. We could represent
our uncertainty in that estimate – and that would always push
the upper limit upward. The higher the upper limit of a uni-
form, the vaguer the theory is. The vaguer the theory is, the more
Bayes punishes the theory, and thus the easier it is to get evidence
for the null. As we already have evidence for the null, represent-
ing uncertainty will not change the qualitative conclusion, only
make it stronger. The next example will consider the rhetorical
status of this issue in the converse case, when the Bayes factor is
insensitive.
In sum, no more data need to be collected; the data are already
sensitive enough to make the point. The non-signiﬁcant result was
rightly published, given it provided as substantial evidence for the
null as a signiﬁcant result might against it.
Interactions that can go in both directions
In the above example, the raw interaction effect was predicted on
theory to go in only one direction, that is, to vary from 0 up to
some positive maximum. We now consider a similar example,
and then generalize to a theory that allows positive and neg-
ative interactions. The latter sort of interaction may be more
difﬁcult to specify limits in a simple way, but in this example
we can.
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Watson et al. (2003) compared the effectiveness of Process
Experiential Therapy (PET; i.e., Emotion Focussed Therapy) with
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) in treating depression. There
were a variety of measures, but for illustration we will look at just
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) on the entire intent-to-treat
sample (n = 93). CBT reduced the BDI from pre- to post-test
(from 25.09 to 12.56), a raw simple effect of time of 12.53. Simi-
larly, PET reduced the BDI from 24.50 to 13.05, a raw simple effect
of 11.45. The F for the group (CBT vs PET) × time (pre vs post)
interaction was 0.18, non-signiﬁcant. In itself, the non-signiﬁcant
interaction does not mean the treatments are equivalent in effec-
tiveness. To know what it does mean, we need to get a handle on
what size interaction effect we would expect.
One theory is based on assuming we know that CBT does work
and is bound to be better than any other therapy for depression.
Then, the population interaction effect (effect of time for CBT –
effect of time for PET) will vary between near 0 (when the effects
are near equal) and the effect of time for CBT (when the other
therapy has no effect). Thus assuming 12.53 to be a sensitive esti-
mate of the population effect of CBT, we can use a uniform for
the alternative from 0 to 13 (rounding up). The sample raw inter-
action effect is 12.53−11.45 = 1.08. The F for the interaction
(0.18) corresponds to a t of
√
0.18 = 0.42. Thus the SE of the
raw interaction effect is 1.08/0.42 = 2.55. With these values for
the calculator (mean = 1.08, SE = 2.55, uniform from 0 to 13),
B = 0.36.
The B just falls short of a conventional criterion for substantial
evidence for equivalence. The evidence is still reasonable, in that
in Bayes sharp conventional cut offs have no absolute meaning
(unlike orthodoxy); evidence is continuous9. Further, we assumed
we had estimated the population effect of CBT precisely. We could
represent some uncertainty in that estimate, e.g., use an upper
limit of a credibility or conﬁdence interval of the effect of CBT
as the upper limit of our uniform. But we might decide as a
defeasible default not to take into account uncertainty in esti-
mates of upper limits of uniforms when we have non-signiﬁcant
results. In this way, more non-signiﬁcant studies come out as
inconclusive; that is, we have a tough standard of evidence for
the null.
It is also worth considering another alternative hypothesis,
namely one which asserts that CBT might be better than PET – or
vice versa. We can represent the predictions of this hypothesis as a
uniform from −11 to +13. (The same logic is used for the lower
limit; i.e., if PET is superior, the most negative the interaction
could be is when the effect of CBT is negligible compared to PET,
so interaction = −effect of time for PET.) Then B = 0.29. That is,
without a pre-existing bias for CBT, there is substantial evidence
for equivalence in the context of this particular study (and it would
get even stronger if we adjusted the limits of the uniform to take
into account uncertainty in their estimation). Even with a bias
for thinking CBT is at least the best, there is modest evidence for
equivalence.
9Indeed, the absence of sharp cut-offs applies to Bayesian intervals as much to
Bayes factors: If a 90% Bayesian interval were within the null region, there would
be grounds for asserting the null region hypothesis, albeit there would be stronger
grounds if a 95% interval were in the null region.
Interaction with degrees of freedom more than 1 and simple effects
Raz et al. (2005) have demonstrated a remarkable effect of hyp-
notic suggestion in a series of studies: Suggesting that the subject
cannot read words, that the stimuli will appear as a meaningless
script, substantially reduces the Stroop effect. Table 2 presents
imaginary but representative data.
The crucial test of the hypothesis that the suggestionwill reduce
the Stroop effect is the Suggestion (present vs absent) × Word
Type (incongruent vs neutral vs congruent) interaction. This
is a 2-degree of freedom effect. However, it naturally decom-
poses into two 1-degree of freedom effects. The Stroop effect
can be thought of as having two components with possibly
different underlying mechanisms: An interference effect (incon-
gruent − neutral) and a facilitation effect (neutral − congruent).
Thus the interaction decomposes into the effect of suggestion on
interference and the effect of suggestion on facilitation. In gen-
eral, multi-degree of action effects often decompose into one
degree of freedom contrasts addressing speciﬁc theoretic ques-
tions. Let’s consider the effect of suggestion on interference (the
same principles of course apply to the effect of suggestion on
facilitation). First, let us say the test for the interaction sugges-
tion (present vs absent) × word type (incongruent vs neutral)
is F(1,40) = 2.25, p = 0.14. Does this mean the effect of sug-
gestion is ineffective in the context of this study for reducing
interference?
The F of 2.25 corresponds to a t of
√
2.25 = 1.5. The raw
interaction effect is (interference effect for no suggestion)− (inter-
ference effect for suggestion)= (850− 750)− (785− 745)= 100 -
40= 60. Thus, the SE for the interaction is 60/1.5= 40.What range
of effects could the population effect plausibly be? If the suggestion
had removed the interference effect completely, the interaction
would be the interference effect for no suggestion (100); con-
versely if the suggestion had been completely ineffective, it would
leave the interference effect as it is, and thus the interaction would
be 0. Thus, we can represent the alternative as a uniform from 0
to 100. This gives a B of 2.39. That is, the data are insensitive but
if anything should increase one’s conﬁdence in the effectiveness of
the suggestion.
Now, let us say the test of the interaction gave us a signiﬁcant
result, e.g., F(1,40) = 4.41, p = 0.04, but the means remain the
same as in Table 2. Now the F corresponds to a t of
√
4.41 = 2.1.
The raw size of interaction is still 60; thus the SE is 60/2.1 = 29.
B is now 5.54, substantial evidence for the effectiveness of sugges-
tion. In fact, the test of the interference effect with no suggestion
is signiﬁcant, t(40) = 2.80, p = 0.008; and the test for the inter-
ference effect for just the suggestion condition gives t(40) = 1.30,
p = 0.20. Has the suggestion eradicated the Stroop interferenc
effect?
Table 2 | (Imaginary) means for the effectiveness of a hypnotic
suggestion to reduce the Stroop effect.
Incongruent Neutral Congruent
No Suggestion 850 750 720
Suggestion 785 745 715
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We do not know if the Stroop effect has been eradicated or just
reduced on the basis of the last non-signiﬁcant result. A Bayes
factor can be used to ﬁnd out. The interference effect is 40. So the
SE is 40/1.3= 31. On the alternative that the interference effect was
not eradicated, the effect will vary between 0 and the effect found
in the no suggestion condition; that is, we can use a uniform from
0 to 100. This gives a B of 1.56. That is, the data are insensitive,
and while we can conclude that the interference effect was reduced
(the interaction indicates that), we cannot yet conclude whether
or not it was abolished.
Paired comparisons
Tan et al. (2009, 2014) tested people on their ability to use a
Brain–Computer Interface (BCI). People were randomly assigned
to three groups: no treatment, 12 weeks of mindfulness medita-
tion, and an active control (12weeks of learning to play the guitar).
The active control was designed (and shown) to create the same
level of expectations as mindfulness meditation in improving BCI
performance. Initially, eight subjects were run in each group. Pre-
post differences on BCI performance were −8, 15, and 9 for the
no-treatment, mindfulness, and active control, respectively. The
difference between mindfulness and active control was not signif-
icant, t(14) = 0.61, p = 0.55. So, is mindfulness any better than an
active control?
Assume the active control and mindfulness were equalized on
non-speciﬁc processes like expectations and beliefs about change,
and mindfulness may or may not contain an additional active
component. Then, the largest the difference between mind-
fulness and active control could be is the difference between
mindfulness and the no-treatment control (i.e., a difference
of 23, which was signiﬁcant). Thus, the alternative can be
represented a uniform from 0 to 23. The actual difference
was 15 − 9 = 6, with a SE of 6/0.61 = 9.8. This gives a
B of 0.89. The data were insensitive. (In fact, with degrees
of freedom less than 30, the SE should be increased slightly
by a correction factor given below. Increasing the SE reduces
sensitivity.)
Thus, the following year another group of participants were
run. One cannot simply top up participants with orthodox
statistics, unless pre-speciﬁed as possible by one’s stopping rule
(Armitage et al., 1969); by contrast, with Bayes, one can always
collect more participants until the data are sensitive enough,
that is, B < 1/3 or B > 3; see e.g., Berger and Wolpert (1988),
Dienes (2008, 2011). Of course, B is susceptible to random ﬂuc-
tuations up and down; why cannot one capitalize on these and
stop when the ﬂuctuations favor a desired result? For exam-
ple, Sanborn and Hills (2014) and Yu et al. (2014) show that
if the null is true, stopping when B > 3 (if that ever occurs)
increases the proportion of cases that B > 3 when the null is
true. However, as Rouder (2014) shows, it also increases the pro-
portion of cases that B > 3 when Ho is false, and to exactly the
same extent: B retains its meaning as relative strength of evi-
dence, regardless of stopping rule (formore discussion, seeDienes,
forthcoming).
With all data together (N = 63), the means for the three groups
were 2, 14, and 6, for no-treatment, mindfulness and active con-
trol, respectively. By conventional statistics, the difference between
the mindfulness group and either of the others was signiﬁcant; for
mindfulness vs meditation, t(41) = 2.45, p = 0.019. The inter-
pretation of the latter result is compromised by the topping up
procedure (one could argue the p is less than 0.05/2, so legiti-
mately signiﬁcant at the 5% level; however, let us say the result
had still been insensitive, would the researchers have collected
more data the following year? If so, the correction should be
more like 0.05/3; see Strube, 2006; Sagarin et al., 2014). A Bayes
factor indicates strength of evidence independent of stopping
rule, however. Assume as before that the maximum the plausi-
ble difference between mindfulness and active control could be
is the difference between mindfulness and no-treatment, that
is, 12. We represent the alternative as a uniform from 0 to 12.
The mean difference between mindfulness and active control is
14 − 6 = 8, with a SE of 8/2.45 = 3.3. This gives a B of 11.45,
strong evidence for the advantage of mindfulness over an active
control.
BAYES WITH A HALF-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
In the previous examples we considered cases where a rough
plausible maximum could be determined. Here, we consider an
illustrative case where a rough expected value can be determined
(and the theory makes a clear directional prediction).
Norming materials
Guo et al. (2013b) constructed lists of nouns that differed in
terms of the size of the object that the words represented, as
rated on a 1–7 bipolar scale (1 = very small; 7 = very big).
Big objects were perceived as bigger than small objects (5.42 vs
2.73), t(38) = 20.05, as was desired. Other dimensions were also
rated including height. Large objects were rated non-signiﬁcantly
taller than small objects on an equivalent scale (5.13 vs 4.5),
t(38) = 1.47, p = 0.15. Are the materials controlled for height?
The difference in size was 5.42 − 2.73 = 2.69. This was taken
to be a representative amount by which the two lists may dif-
fer on another dimension, like height. Thus, a B was calculated
assuming a half-normal with SD = 2.69. (The test is directional
because it is implausible that big objects would be shorter, unless
specially selected to be so.) The “mean” was 5.13 − 4.5 = 0.63
height units, the SE = 0.63/1.47 = 0.43 height units. This yields
B = 0.83. The data are insensitive; no conclusions follow as
to whether height was controlled. (Using the same half-normal,
the lists were found to be equivalent on familiarity and valence,
Bs< 1/3. These dimensions would be best analyzed with full nor-
mal distributions (i.e., mean of 0, SD = 2.69), but if the null is
supported with half-normal distributions it is certainly supported
with full normal distributions, because the latter entail vaguer
alternatives.)
BAYES WITH A NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
A half-normal distribution is intrinsically associated with a the-
ory that makes directional predictions. A normal distribution
may be used for theories that do not predict direction, as well
as those that do. In the second case, the normal rather than
half-normal is useful where it is clear that a certain effect is pre-
dicted and smaller effects are increasingly unlikely. One example is
considered.
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Theory roughly predicts a certain value and smaller values are
not more likely. Fu et al. (2013b) tested Chinese and UK peo-
ple on ability to implicitly learn global or local structures. A
culture (Chinese vs British) by level (global vs local) interac-
tion was obtained. Chinese were superior than British people at
the global level, RT difference in learning effects = 50 ms, with
SE= 14 ms. The difference at the local level was 15 ms, SE = 13 ms,
t(47) = 1.31, p = 0.20. Fu et al. (2013b) wished to consider the
theory that Chinese outperform British people simply because of
greater motivation. If this were true, then Chinese people should
outperform British people at the local level to the same extent as
they outperform British at the global level. We can represent our
knowledge of how well this is by a normal distribution with a
mean of 50 and a SD of 14. This gives B = 0.25. That is, relative
to this theory, the null is supported. The motivation theory can be
rejected based both on the signiﬁcant interaction and on the Bayes
factor.
My typical default for a normal distribution is to use
SD = mean/2. This would suggest an SD of 25 rather than 14, the
latter being the SD of the sampling distribution of the estimated
effect in the global condition. In this case, where the same partic-
ipants are being run on the same paradigm with a minor change
to which motivation should be blind, the sampling distribution of
the effect in one condition stands as a good representation of our
knowledge of its effect in the other condition, assuming a process
blind to the differences between conditions10. Defaults are good
to consider, but they are not binding.
SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS IN USING BAYES
FACTORS
Appendix 1 gives further examples, illustrating trend analysis, the
use of standardized effect sizes, and why sometimes raw effect sizes
are required to address scientiﬁc problems; it also indicates how to
easily extend the use of the Dienes (2008) Bayes calculator to sim-
ple meta-analysis, correlations, and contingency tables. Appendix
2 considers other methods for comparing relative evidence (e.g.,
likelihood inference andBIC, theBayesian InformationCriterion).
Appendix 3 considers how to check the robustness of conclusions
that follow from Bayes factors.
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DIENES (2008) CALCULATOR
The calculator assumes the parameter estimate is normally dis-
tributed with known variance. However, in a t-test situation we
have only estimated the variance. If the population distribution
of observations is normal, and degrees of freedom are above
30, then the assumption of known variance is good enough (see
Wilcox, 2010, for problems when the underlying distribution is
not normal). For degrees of freedom less than 30, the follow-
ing correction should be applied to the SE: Increase the SE by a
factor (1 + 20/df × df) (adapted from Berry, 1996; it produces
a good approximation to t, over-correcting by a small amount).
For example if the df = 13 and the SE of the difference is 5.1,
we need to correct by [1 + 20/(13 × 13)] = 1.12. That is, the
SE we will enter is 5.1 × 1.12 = 5.7. If degrees of freedom have
10Using SD = mean/2 is like using the sampling distribution of the mean when it is
only just signiﬁcantly different from 0.
been adjusted in a t-test (on the same comparison as a Bayes
factor is to be calculated for) to account for unequal variances,
the adjusted degrees of freedom should be used in the correc-
tion. No adjustment is made when the dependent variable is
(Fisher z transformed) correlations or for the contingency table
analyses illustrated in the Appendix, as in these cases the SE is
known.
Note that the assumptions of the Dienes (2008) calculator are
speciﬁc to that calculator and not to Bayes generally. Bayes is
a general all-purpose method that can be applied to any speci-
ﬁed distribution or to a bootstrapped distribution (e.g., Jackman,
2009; Kruschke, 2010a; Lee andWagenmakers, 2014; see Kruschke,
2013b, for a Bayesian analysis that allows heavy-tailed distribu-
tions). Bayes is also not limited to one degree of freedom contrasts,
as the Dienes (2008) calculator is (see Hoijtink et al., 2008, for
Bayes factors on complex hypotheses involving a set of inequality
constraints). However, pin point tests of theoretical predictions
are generally one degree of freedom contrasts (e.g., Lewis, 1993;
Rosenthal et al., 2000). Multiple degree of freedom tests usually
serve as precursors to one degree of freedom tests simply to con-
trol familywise error rates (though see Hoijtink et al., 2008). But
for a Bayesian analysis one should not correct for what other
tests are conducted (only data relevant to a hypothesis should
be considered to evaluate that hypothesis), so one can go directly
to the theoretically relevant speciﬁc contrasts of interest (Dienes,
2011; for more extended discussion see Dienes, forthcoming; and
Kruschke, 2010a for the use of hierarchical modeling for dealing
with multiple comparisons).
POWER, INTERVALS, AND BAYES
No matter how much power one has, a sensitive result is never
guaranteed. Sensitivity can be guaranteed with intervals and Bayes
factors: One can collect data until the interval is smaller than
the null region and is either in or out of the null region, or
until the Bayes factor is either greater than three or less than
a third (see Dienes, 2008, in press for related discussion; in
fact, error probabilities are controlled remarkably well with such
methods, see Sanborn and Hills, 2014, for limits and excep-
tions, and Rouder, 2014, for the demonstration that the Bayes
factor always retains its meaning as strength of evidence – how
much more likely the data are on H1 than H0 – regardless of
stopping rule). Because power does not make use of the actual
data to assess its sensitivity, one should assess the actual sen-
sitivity of obtained data with either intervals or Bayes factors.
Thus, one can run until sensitivity has been reached. Even if
one cannot collect more data, there is still no point referring
to power once the data are in. The study may be low pow-
ered, but the data actually sensitive; or the study may be high
powered, and the data actually insensitive. Power is helpful in
ﬁnding out a rough number of observations needed; intervals
and Bayes factors can be used thereafter to assess data (cf. Royall,
1997).
Consider a study investigating whether imagining kicking a
football for 20 min every day for a month increased the number of
shots into goal out of 100 kicks. Real practice in kicking 20 min a
day increases performance by 12 goals.We set this as themaximum
of a uniform. What should the minimum be? The minimum is
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needed to interpret a conﬁdence or other interval. It is hard to say
for sure what the minimum should be. A score of 0.01 goals may
not be worth it, but maybe 1 goal would be? Let us set 0.5 as the
minimum.
The imagination condition led to an improvement of 0.4 goals
with a SE of 1. Using a uniform from 0.5 to 12, B = 0.11,
indicating substantial evidence for the null hypothesis. If we
used a uniform from 0 to 12, B = 0.15, hardly changed. How-
ever, a conﬁdence (or other) interval would declare the results
insensitive, as the interval extends outside the null region (even
a 68% interval, provided by 0.4 ± 1 goals). The Bayes fac-
tor makes use of the full range of predictions of the alternative
hypothesis, and can use this information to most sensitively draw
conclusions (conditional on the information it assumes; Jaynes,
2003). Further, the Bayes factor is most sensitive to the maxi-
mum, which could be speciﬁed reasonably objectively. Inference
by intervals is completely dependent on speciﬁcation of the min-
imum, which is often hard to specify objectively. However, if
the minimum were easy to objectively specify and the maxi-
mum hard in a particular case, it is inference by intervals that
would be most sensitive to the known constraints, and would be
the preferred solution. In that sense, Bayes factors and intervals
complement each other in their strengths and weaknesses (see
Table 3)11.
11When a null region can be speciﬁed, Bayesian intervals and Bayes factors
can be related (cf Kruschke, 2013b Appendix D; Wetzels et al., 2009, for
a somewhat different way of making the relationship). Let the alternative
hypothesis be the complement of the null region. Deﬁne a prior distribu-
tion. The prior odds is the area representing the alternative divided by the
area in the null region. Update the prior to obtain the posterior distribu-
tion (see e.g., Kruschke, 2013b, or tools on the website for Dienes, 2008:
http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/bayes_normalposte
rior.swf). The strength of evidence that the data provide for the alternative
hypothesis over the null is the degree to which the evidence changes the prior
odds: The Bayes factor is the posterior odds divided by the prior odds. Example:
A prior of N(0, 1) and data of N(0.5, 0.2), i.e., mean = 0.5, SE = 0.2, gives
a posterior (using the software on the website of Dienes, 2008, to obtain pos-
teriors: http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/bayes_no
rmalposterior.swf) of N(0.48, 0.2). For a null region of [−0.1, 0.1], using areas
under the normal curve, we get B = 36.17/11.55 = 3.13. (This is not using the
In sum, in many cases, Bayes factors may be useful not only
when there is little chance of collecting more data, so as to extract
the most out of the data; but also in setting stopping rules for
grant applications, or schemes like Registered Reports in the jour-
nal Cortex, so as to collect data in the most efﬁcient way (for an
example see Wagenmakers et al., 2012). (By estimating the rele-
vant SD and likely population effect in advance of running an
experiment, you can enter into the calculator different SEs based
on different N, and ﬁnd the N for which B > 3 or <1/3. This
provides an estimate of the required N. But, unlike with orthodox
statistics, it is not an estimate you have committed to; cf. Royall,
1997; Kruschke, 2010a).
WHY CHOOSE ONE DISTRIBUTION RATHER THAN ANOTHER?
On a two-alternative recognition test we have determined that a
rough likely level of performance, should knowledge exist, is 60%,
and we are happy that it is not very plausible for performance to
exceed 70%, nor to go below chance baseline (50%). Performance
is 55% with a SE of 2.6%. To determine a Bayes factor, we need
ﬁrst to rescale so that the null hypothesis is 0. So we subtract 50%
from all scores. Thus, the “mean” is 5% and the SE 2.6%. We
can use a uniform from 0 to 20 to represent the constraint that
the score lies between chance and 20% above chance. This gives
B = 2.01.
Butwemight have argued that as 60% (i.e., 10%above baseline)
was rather likely on the theory (and background knowledge) we
could use a normal distribution with a mean of 10% and a SD of
mean/2 = 5%. (Note this representation still entails that the true
population value is somewhere between roughly 0 and 20.) This
gives B = 1.98, barely changed. Or why not, you ask, use a half-
normal distribution with the expected typical value, 10%, as the
SD? (Note this representation still entails that the true population
value is somewhere between 0 and roughly 20.) This givesB= 2.75,
Dienes, 2008, Bayes factor calculator, just areas under the normal, with e.g.,
http://davidmlane.com/hyperstat/z_table.html). Conversely, a prior of N(0, 1) and
data of (0, 0.1) give a posterior of N(0, 0.1) and B = 0.19. (Check these numbers
for homework.)
Table 3 | Comparing intervals and Bayes for interpreting a non-significant result.
What does it tell you? What do you need to link data to
theory?
Amount of data needed to
obtain evidence for the null?
What would be a useful
stopping rule to guarantee
sensitivity?
Intervals How precisely a parameter
has been estimated; a
reﬂection of data rather than
theory.
A minimal value below which
the theory is refuted.
Enough to make sure the width
of the interval is less than that
of the null region; considerable
participant numbers will
typically be needed in contrast
to Bayes factors.
Interval width no more than
null region width and interval
either completely in or
completely out of the null
region.
Bayes factors The strength of evidence the
data provide for one theory
over another; speciﬁc to the
two theories contrasted.
A rough expected value or
maximum value consistent with
theory.
Bayes factors ensure maximum
efﬁciency in use of participants,
given a Bayes factor measures
strength of evidence.
Bayes factor either greater
than three or less than a
third.
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somewhat different but qualitatively the same conclusion. In all
cases the conclusion is that more evidence is needed. (Compare
also the different ways of specifying the alternative provided by
Rouder et al., 2009; see Appendix 3 for comparisons.) In this case,
there may be no clear theoretical reason for preferring one of the
distributions over the other for representing the alternative. But
as radically shifting the distribution around (from ﬂat to humped
right up against one extreme to humped in the middle) made no
qualitative difference to conclusions we can trust the conclusions.
Always perform a robustness check: Could theoretical con-
straints be just as readily represented in a different way, where
the real theory is neutral to the different representations? Check
that you get the same conclusion with the different representa-
tions. If not, run more participants until you do. If you cannot
collect more data, acknowledge ambiguity in the conclusion (as
was done by e.g., Shang et al., 2013). (See Kruschke, 2013c, for the
equivalent robustness check for inference by intervals.) Appendix
3 considers robustness in more detail.
Different ways of representing the alternative may clearly cor-
respond to different theories, as was illustrated in example 2 in
Appendix 1. Indeed, one of the virtues of Bayes is that it asks one
to consider theory, and the relation of theory to data, carefully.
BUT HOW CAN ANY CONSTRAINTS BE SET ON WHAT MY
ALTERNATIVE PREDICTS?
The examples in this paper (including the appendix) have illus-
trated ﬁnding constraints by use of data from different conditions,
constraints intrinsic to the design and logic of the theory, and
those provided by standardized effect sizes and regression slopes
to convert different raw units of measurement into each other; and
Dienes (in press) provides examples where constraints intrinsic to
the measurement scale are very useful. However, there is one thing
one cannot do, and that is to use the very effect itself, or its con-
ﬁdence interval, as the basis for predicting that same effect. For
example, if the obtained mean difference was 15 ms, one cannot
for that reason set the alternative to a half-normal distribution
with a SD of 15. One can use other aspects of the same data to
provide constraints, but not the very aspect that one is testing
(Jaynes, 2003). Double counting the mean difference in both the
data summary and as specifying the predictions of the alternative
violates the axioms of probability in updating theory probabilities.
This problem creates pressure to demand default alternatives for
Bayes factors, on the grounds that letting people construct their
own alternative is open to abuse (Kievit, 2011).
The Bayes factor stands as a good evaluation of a theory to the
extent that its assumptions can be justiﬁed. And fortunately, all
assumptions that go into a Bayes factor are public. So, the type
of abuse peculiar to Bayes (that is, representing what a theory
predicts in ways favorable with respect to how the data actually
turned out) is entirely transparent. It is open to public scrutiny
and debate (unlike many of the factors that affect signiﬁcance test-
ing; see Dienes, 2011). Specifying what predictions a theory makes
is also part of the substance of science. It is precisely what we
should be trying to engage with, in the context of public debate.
Trying to convince people of one’s theory with cheap rhetorical
tricks is the danger that comes with allowing argument over the-
ories at all. Science already contains the solution to that problem,
namely transparency, the right of everyone in principle to voice
an argument, and commitment to norms of accountability to evi-
dence and logic. When the theory itself does work in determining
the representation of the alternative, the Bayes factor genuinely
informs us about the bearing of evidence on theory.
SUBJECTIVE VS OBJECTIVE BAYES
Bayesian approaches are often divided into subjective Bayes and
objective Bayes (Stone, 2013). Being Bayesian at all in statis-
tics is deﬁned by allowing probabilities for population parameter
values (and for theories more generally), and using such proba-
bility distributions for inference. Whenever one of the examples
above asked for a speciﬁcation what the theory predicts, it meant
an assignment of a probability density distribution to different
parameter values. How are these probabilities to be interpreted?
The subjective Bayesian says that these probabilities can only be
obtained by looking deep in one’s soul; probabilities are intrinsi-
cally subjective (e.g., Howson and Urbach, 2006). That is, it is all a
matter of judgment. The objective Bayesian says that rather than
relying on personal or subjective judgment, one should describe
a problem situation such that the conclusions objectively follow
from the stated constraints; every rational person should draw the
same conclusions (e.g., Jaynes, 2003).
The approach in this paper respects both camps. The approach
is objective in that the examples illustrate rules of thumb that can
act as (contextually relevant) defaults, where the probability dis-
tributions are speciﬁed in simple objective ways by reference to
data or logical or mathematical relations inherent in the design.
No example relied on anyone saying, “according to my intu-
ition the mean should be two because that’s how I feel” (cf.
Howard et al., 2000, for such priors). But the approach is subjec-
tive in that the examples illustrate that only scientiﬁc judgment
can determine the right representation of the theory’s predic-
tions given the theory and existing background knowledge; and
that scientiﬁc judgment entails that all defaults are defeasible
– because science is subject to the frame problem, and doing
Bayes is doing science. Being a subjectivist means a given Bayes
factor can be treated not as THE objective representation of
the relation of the theory to evidence, but as the best given
the current level of discussion, and it could be improved if
e.g., another condition was run which informed what the the-
ory predicted in this context (e.g., deﬁned a maximum value
more clearly). A representation of the theory can be provision-
ally accepted as reﬂecting current judgment and ignorance about
the theory.
CONCLUSION
This paper has explored the interpretation of non-signiﬁcant
results. A key aspect of the argument is that non-signiﬁcant results
cannot be interpreted in a theoretical vacuum. What is needed is
a way of conducting statistics that more intimately links theory to
data, either via inference by intervals or via Bayes factors. Using
canned statistical solutions to force theorizing is backward; statis-
tics are to be the handmaiden of science, not science the butler boy
of statistics.
Bayes has its own coherent logic that makes it radically different
from signiﬁcance testing. To be clear, a two-step decision process
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is not being advocated in this paper whereby Bayes is only per-
formed after a non-signiﬁcant result. Bayes can – and should –
be performed any time a theory is being tested. At this stage of
statistical practice, however, orthodox statistics typically need to
be performed for papers to be accepted in journals. In cases where
orthodoxy fails to provide an answer, Bayes can be very useful. The
most common case where orthodoxy fails is where non-signiﬁcant
results are obtained. But there are other cases. For example, when
a reviewer asks for more subjects to be run, and the original results
were already tested at the 5% level, Bayesian statistics are needed
(as in the Tan et al. (2014) example above; orthodoxy is ruled
out by its own logic in this case). Running a Bayes factor when
non-signiﬁcant results are obtained is simply a way that we as
a community can come to know Bayes, and to obtain answers
where we need answers, and none are forthcoming from ortho-
doxy. Once there is a communal competence in interpreting Bayes,
frequentist orthodox statistics may cease to be conducted at all (or
maybe just in cases where no substantial theory exists, and no
prior constraints exists – that is, in impoverished pre-scientiﬁc
environments).
One complaint about the approach presented here could be
the following: “I am used to producing statistics that are indepen-
dent of my theory. Traditionally, we could agree on the statistics,
whatever our theories. Now the statistical result depends on spec-
ifying what my theory predicts. That means I might have to think
about mechanisms by which the theory works, relate those mecha-
nisms to previous data, argue with peers about how theory relates
to different experiments, connect theory to predictions in ways
that peers may argue about. All of this may produce consider-
able discussion before we can determine which if any theory has
been supported!” The solution to this problem is the problem
itself.
Bayes can be criticized because it relies on“priors,”and itmay be
difﬁcult to specify what those priors are. Priors ﬁgure in Bayesian
reasoning in two ways. The basic Bayesian schema can be repre-
sented as: Posterior odds in two theories = Bayes factor × prior
odds in two theories. The prior odds in two theories are a sort of
prior. The approach illustrated in this paper has lifted the Bayes
factor out of that context and treated it alone as a measure of
strength of evidence (cf. Royall, 1997; Rouder et al., 2009). So
there is no need to specify that sort of prior. But the Bayes factor
itself requires specifying what the theories predict, and this is also
called a prior. Hopefully it is obvious that if one wants to know
how much evidence supports a theory, one has to know what the
theory predicts.
The approach in this paper, though Bayesian, involves
approaching analysis in a different way in detail than one would
if one followed, say, Kruschke (2010a) or Lee and Wagenmak-
ers (2014), who also deﬁne themselves as teaching the Bayesian
approach. There are many ways of being a Bayesian and they
are not exclusive. The philosophy of the approach here, as also
illustrated in my papers published to date using Bayes, is to
make the minimal changes to current practice in the simplest way
that would still bring many of the advantages of Bayesian infer-
ence. In many cases, orthodox and Bayesian analyses will actually
agree (e.g., Simonsohn, unpublished, which is reassuring, even to
Bayesians). A key place where they disagree is in the interpretation
of non-signiﬁcant results. In practice, orthodox statistics have not
been used in a way that justiﬁes any conclusion. So one strat-
egy, at least initially, is to continue to use orthodox statistics,
but also introduce Bayesian statistics simultaneously. Wherever
non-signiﬁcant results arise from which one wants to draw any
conclusion, a Bayes factor can be employed to disambiguate, as
illustrated in this paper (or a credibility or other interval, if min-
ima can be simply established). In that way reviewers and readers
get to see the analyses they know how to interpret, and the Bayes
provides extra information where orthodoxy does not provide
any answer. Thus, people can get used to Bayes and its proper
use gradually debated and established. There need be no sudden
wholesale replacement of conventional analyses. Thus, you do not
need to wait for the revolution; your very next paper can use
Bayes.
The approach in this paper also misses out on many of the
advantages of Bayes. For example, Bayesian hierarchical model-
ing can be invaluable (Kruschke, 2010a; Lee and Wagenmakers,
2014). Indeed, it can be readily combinedwith the approach in this
paper. That is, the use of priors in the sense not used here can aid
data analysis in important ways. Further, the advantages of Bayes
go well beyond the interpretation of non-signiﬁcant results (e.g.,
Dienes, 2011). This paper is just a small part of a larger research
program. But the problem it addresses has been an Achilles heel of
conventional practice (Oakes, 1986; Wagenmakers, 2007). From
now on, all editors, reviewers and authors can decide: whenever
a non-signiﬁcant result is used to draw any conclusion, it must
be justiﬁed by either inference by intervals or measures of relative
evidence. Or else you remain silent.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online
at: http://www.frontiersin.org/journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00781/
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